Russian Sources Signal Possible End to Oil Production Cuts

With oil prices nearing their highest since early March, Kirill Dmitriev, one of Russia’s top oil negotiators  signaled his will to draw down production cuts on Friday June 19. Dmitriev is one of the key players leading negotiations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Agreements between OPEC and the Russian-led alliance of non-OPEC countries, called OPEC+, have been one of the primary factors in the efforts to stabilize the oil market.

With demand for oil increasing as economies reopen, Russia appears to see no point in further extending production cuts. The existing agreement calls for a global production cut of 7.7 million barrels per day, from August to December. From January 2021, production cuts would drop to 5.8 million barrels per day, lasting until April 2022 when the agreement expires.

Price uptick

In April, oil prices hit their lowest price since the turn of the millennium as high global supply met an unprecedented dip in demand when flights were grounded, citizens faced lockdowns, and non-essential economic activity dissipated. In April prices hit $16 per barrel, with WTI briefly dipping into historic negative territory amid a scramble to offload futures before their expiry.

The extreme fluctuations in the already volatile oil market prompted most of the world’s oil producing countries to come together to establish painful, but necessary, production cuts in order to ease over supply that led to oil storage running out, with tankers and oil bunkers used as temporary storage to accommodate for a lack of buyers.

OPEC+

Ever since, any news around negotiations over production cuts between OPEC and the OPEC+ groups has led to swings in global oil prices. Now that demand is increasing and most OPEC members report compliance with the agreed upon cuts, meetings have revolved more around suring up lagging countries like Iraq and Kazachstan.

The current oil price hovers around $40, sufficient for Russia to balance its budgets. For many higher-cost oil producers however, the current price means losses, involuntary production cuts and even bankruptcies. The US shale gas industry, Canadian tar-sand extraction and Brazilian off-shore oil all struggle to survive at current prices, while countries like Saudi Arabia would be able to live with “lower for longer.”

OPEC

But while many OPEC members in the Gulf could make a profit on current prices, their national budgets have been based on much higher prices, leaving major gaps. A country like Iraq, that has some of the cheapest oil to extract, still needs oil prices to be at $56 per barrel in order to fund the $135 billion in estimated state revenue. The country has struggled to comply with OPEC’s agreed cuts as most of its oil production is done by foreign supermajors, leading to difficult negotiations.

Many countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) similarly presented ambitious budgets for 2020, expecting much higher revenues than those that materialized due to the COVID-19 crisis. For these countries production cuts remain one of the few tools to drive prices up further, but it appears that major players like Russia and Saudi Arabia would prefer oil prices to not increase too rapidly, in order to prevent a resurgence in its higher-cost competitors like shale gas.

Diverging forecasts

Saudi Arabia and Russia are expected to have a much larger market-share in the near future. After a decade of losing market-share to US producers, Saudi Arabia is expected to have the largest market-share since the 1980s. With production down significantly and demand slowly returning, prices are likely to go up in the long run.

Investment bank JP Morgan Chase in early March predicted oil to hit $190 per barrel due to a “supercycle” where a downward swing in prices is followed by equally dramatic upswing. The bank’s predictions were squashed by the COVID-19 related drop in demand, but its experts remain confident that a “bullish supercycle is on the horizon,” according to CNN.

“The reality is the chances of oil going toward $100 at this point are higher than three months ago,” JP morgan’s Christyan Malek. However, uncertainty remains as economic results are highly dependent on public health successes in containing the spread of the coronavirus. BP has slashed its forecast, expecting COVID-19 to have an “enduring impact on the global economy.”

Qatar Under Fire as 2022 FIFA World Cup Workers Await Payment

Workers building the Al Bayt Stadium went without pay for seven months as their employer, Qatar Meta Coats (QMC), failed to compensate them. Qatar’s World Cup organizing body has banned QMC from obtaining further contracts for world cup projects and required the company to pay three months of salaries owed. 

Despite the progress many workers are still owed wages. Many were unable to renew their work permits after the company was sold and new management came in to resolve the payments issue. 

The Pakistani government has raised concerns with the Qatari Ministry of Labor over the mistreatment and non-payment of approximately 80,000 Pakistani workers contributing to the effort to build stadiums, roads, and accommodation. In addition to individual workers, Pakistani company Descon claims that Qatari authorities failed to pay them for their services, a concern which Pakistani officials have also raised. 

Amnesty International has long sought to highlight the plight of migrant workers in Qatar running a campaign entitled “Qatar World Cup of Shame.” On the issue of non-payment of wages, Amnesty’s Head of Economic and Social Justice, Steven Cockburn, said, “This case is the latest damning illustration of how easy it still is to exploit workers in Qatar.” 

Amnesty has also questioned why, if Qatar knew about non-payment issues from July, 2019, as the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy has indicated, the government allowed the employer to continue to exploit workers for months.

Pakistani workers have said they lost their jobs after reporting non-payment to Qatari authorities, creating fear among workers to speak out and underlining the inadequacies in Qatar’s complaints processes for migrant workers. 

Despite the well documented abuse of migrant workers, FIFA refuses to take responsibility, disputing claims that ongoing mistreatment of workers is indicative of the organization’s disregard for human rights. 

A controversial choice

The selection of Qatar to host the 2022 cup was a controversial choice given the lack of infrastructure and extreme heat. The competition normally takes place during the summer period. Investigations into FIFA, launched by the United States, later revealed that Qatar won the bid as a result of extensive bribes given to FIFA officials. 

As detailed by Arabia Policy in April, former FIFA President Sepp Blatter suggested that the United States could end up hosting the 2022 cup instead of Qatar. Whilst a change of host country is unlikely to occur, Blatter’s suggestion highlights the ongoing trepidation about Qatar’s ability to host the cup. 

The ongoing exploitation of migrant workers in Qatar is a cause for international concern and is a further stain on the Gulf nation’s World Cup, prior to the event kicking-off in over two years’ time. 

Qatari Royals, Banks Allegedly Actors in Terrorism Financing Conspiracy

For decades, the small, gas-rich emirate of Qatar has apparently served as a major conduit for terror financing, funneling millions of dollars to hard-line Islamist militants across the Middle East.

Both international and domestic law have previously failed to confront the impunity of the Qatari government in seemingly financing terrorist organizations. However, a private lawsuit in a New York district court is challenging this, alleging that the Qatari royal family and leading Qatari banking institutions are complicit in a conspiracy to fund Islamist terrorism in the Middle East.

The lawsuit specifically names Masraf Al Rayan bank, Qatar Charity, and Qatar National Bank as the principal conspirators responsible for funneling resources to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) organization. The lawsuit further ties these organizations to the Qatari royal family and others within Qatar’s elite.

“It has long been the official policy of the government of Qatar to provide financial support to the Hamas terrorist organization,” the lawsuit reads. 

“It is thus no surprise that Masraf Al Rayan bank, Qatar Charity, and Qatar National Bank, which are dominated by the Qatari government and royal family, have joined in that effort.”

Qatar Charity—whose board of directors’ chairman, Hamad bin Nasser al-Thani, is a member of the Qatari royal family—allegedly spearheaded the operation, whereas the lawsuit identifies the other two institutions as middle-men.

“Qatar coopted several institutions that it dominates and controls to funnel coveted US dollars (the chosen currency of Middle East terrorist networks) to Hamas and PIJ under the false guise of charitable donations,” the lawsuit alleges.

The alleged logistics

At the center of the conspiracy, Qatar Charity allegedly solicited donations from benefactors in Qatar and elsewhere before transferring the funds to an account at Masraf Al Rayan bank in Doha.

The account’s funds would be subsequently transferred to a bank in New York, before being wired as US Dollars to Qatar Charity’s accounts at either the Bank of Palestine or the Islamic Bank in Ramallah. 

Finally, the funds—still in US Dollars—would then be directly distributed by Qatar Charity’s local branches to Hamas, the PIJ, and their affiliate organizations.

With Qatar Charity’s board led by a member of the royal family, paired with the significant influence the royal family has on both Masraf Al Rayan bank and Qatar National Bank, the connection between Qatar’s leadership and the financing conspiracy is apparent.

However, despite the ties between the Qatari government and the financial organizations coming to light, the question still remains as to whether Doha is ultimately complicit with the alleged conspiracy.

In the past, Qatar has defended itself from similar allegations, arguing that these fundraising efforts were untaken by individuals, rather than officials. As a result, Qatar contends that the government is not responsible for these activities.

Despite this, there is no denying there is a long history of systematic terror financing operations within Qatar’s borders.

Financing Terror

“Like any enterprise, terrorist organizations need money to operate,” the lawsuit argues.

“But unlike legitimate organizations, terrorist organizations like Hamas rely on sympathetic nation states and financial institutions who employ creative fundraising strategies to disguise their operations and evade anti-terrorism laws.”

For decades, Qatar has served the role of this sympathetic nation, claims a 2014 Foreign Policy report, saying that Qatar has been harboring financial institutions accused of financing and sponsoring terrorist organizations. The report added that Qatari policy favors these financial institutions, and terrorist financiers in the country often go unpunished.

Qatar’s policy of supporting extremists stretches back to the 1990s, initially aiding Salafist activists with disseminating and politicizing the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. By the next decade, Doha became the center for an interconnected network of radicals throughout the Gulf. Accusations of this stem from a wide variety of official and journalistic sources, with Israeli diplomat Ron Prosor going so far as to call Qatar a “Club Med for terrorists.”

Beyond serving as a safe haven for extremist ideology, Doha would become the epicenter for a far-reaching conspiracy to launder money linked to al-Qaeda through Qatar-based charities.

Doha has since pursued its ambitions further, directly funding foreign insurgent groups in a bid to extend Qatar’s influence beyond the small peninsula it occupies. However, through its active sponsorship of extremist groups, Qatar has played an influential role in fueling the worsening of conflict zones across the Arab world.

Influence in regional conflicts

In 2011, Qatar expanded its network of radical proxies to Libya, where it joined the UAE and US in opposing the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli. Although Qatar had aligned itself with much of the world in supporting the ousting of Gaddafi, Doha’s ambitions stretched further. 

As the US waged a campaign of airstrikes to weaken the Libyan state, Doha began funding insurgent groups on the ground. After months of conflict, rebels had taken Tripoli, Gaddafi was dead, and Doha found itself with an unprecedented influence in the new Libya.

When the Arab Spring turned its attention to Syria, so too did Doha. In the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, between 2012 and 2013, Salafists in Kuwait and Qatar would begin to join forces with Syrian expatriates, ultimately coalescing into the al-Nusra Front. Qatar would quickly become among the principal financial supporters for the Syrian opposition.

However, Libya remains a broken and conflicted state despite an apparent victory in 2011, and Syria continues to be a battleground between the regime of Bashar al-Assad and his opposition. 

Critics claim Qatar’s foreign policy has failed. Because Qatar continues to support insurgents exclusively through financing networks not overtly affiliated with the government, as they argue, Doha remains untouched by the consequences. For its part, Qatar maintains that it has been a valuable ally to the United States and the West in counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East.

“We’ve been asked by our American friends if we can join, and we did,” said Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar.

In addition, Doha continues to be one of the most important sponsors for Hamas and the PIJ. Between 2012 and 2018, Qatar invested $1.1 billion in the Gaza strip, with Israeli outlet Haaretz reporting a large percentage of this went directly to support Hamas.

Doha also has an extensive history with supporting Hamas beyond financial contributions. Since 2012, Doha has offered sanctuary for a number of Hamas’ most prominent figures, including its political leader Khaled Meshal and the founder of its military wing, Saleh al-Arouri.

This close relationship with Hamas and the PIJ—in addition to Doha’s history of turning a blind eye to terrorist financiers—has often led it into conflict with both its neighbors and the West, in particular the United States.

Repercussions Abroad

In the Middle East, Qatar’s alleged relationship with terrorist organizations and their financiers has led to heightened tensions with its close neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt. All of these countries severed ties with Qatar in 2017.

For its part, Qatar has continued to deny all allegations of the government’s relationship to terrorist organizations. Qatar has also argued that the severance of ties was illegitimate and a “violation of its sovereignty.” Doha further maintains that the blockade is a danger to unity within the Gulf.

“The Gulf summit statement talked about a unified Gulf, but where is it amid the continuation of Qatar’s blockade?” said Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatar’s foreign minister.

Abroad, the United States and the United Kingdom have criticized Qatar for its relationship with Hamas, with the latter investigating Qatari-based charities for their potential link to the terrorist organization.

The families of ten Americans either killed or injured by violence allegedly perpetrated by either Hamas or the PIJ brought the lawsuit forward, further emphasizing the impact that the lawsuit will have in the United States.

Among the victims named in the lawsuit is Taylor Force, a 28-year-old American student and former Army officer killed in Tel Aviv by a Palestinian terrorist in 2016. Force’s death later prompted Congress to pass the Taylor Force Act, which ended US aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) until the PA ended its support for the Palestinian Authority Martyr’s Fund.

The Palestinian Authority Martyr’s Fund, operated by the PA, is designed to pay a stipend to the families of Palestinians killed, injured, or imprisoned for involvement in anti-Israeli violence. Many have criticized the fund for potentially encouraging the very same terrorism which killed Taylor Force and other plaintiffs mentioned in the lawsuit.

With the administration of US President Donald Trump increasing its support for Israel and aligning itself in opposition to Hamas, Qatar’s support for Hamas has become a point of contention between the two countries.

Qatar-US diplomatic tensions

This is not new information to the United States government, which has been aware of Qatar’s close relationship with Hamas since the early 2000s.

Leaked US diplomatic cables from 2009 show that the US government previously listed Qatar Charity as a “terrorism support entity” for “having demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations.”

Qatar Charity has been further accused of affiliation with the Union of Good, an organization created by Hamas to facilitate the transfer of donations to Hamas-controlled organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States has also designated the Union of Good as a supporter of terrorism.

The lawsuit is ultimately posed to reawaken an old discussion regarding the United States and its relationship with Qatar, as well as whether Qatar should be held accountable for its alleged role in supporting terrorist organizations.

 

Read also: Qatar Under Fire as 2022 FIFA World Cup Workers Await Payment

IIF: Gulf Countries Facing Historic Economic Crisis

The six nations that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are facing heavy impacts from the coronavirus pandemic and a drop in oil prices amid a sudden demand slump. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are in for a difficult period according to the International Institute for Finance (IIF), a global association of financial institutions.

The Institute had already announced that emerging markets are facing an “unparalleled sudden stop,” with capital leaving the economies of developing nations at never-before-seen rates. Capital is flowing from emerging markets to developed ones at over five times the rate at the worst point of the 2008 global financial crisis.

Triple threat

For the six GCC countries, local economies are suffering from a trifecta of bad news. Capital flows are moving to developed nations and oil revenues have cratered while tourism, hospitality, retail, and travel sectors are all facing unprecedented difficulties due to stringent COVID-19 measures.

Despite the overall relatively successful containment of the coronavirus, GCC countries are set to see a contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 4.4% according to IIF predictions. The World Bank in 2019 had predicted GDP growth between 1% and 4% for most GCC countries, an improvement over the previous year. Oman was considered one of the Council’s members most likely to grow, with an increase estimated at 3.7% due to increased natural gas production.

Oil revenue and state budgets

But the coronavirus and an international “war” over oil prices means the region is now in for a contraction in GDP. The IIF is cheering on unpopular austerity measures as a means to stop deficits from growing as cuts in public spending “could more than offset losses stemming from reduced oil exports.” Even with unpopular and painful spending cuts, the Gulf Council’s aggregate deficits are expected to increase to 10.3% of GDP.

Oman, which the World Bank touted as the GCC country most likely to grow significantly in 2020, is now considered “an increasingly vulnerable spot in the region in light of its mounting debt.” The country could face an economic contraction of 5.3% while its deficit is likely to widen to 16.1%, according to the IIF.

Opportunity to reform?

The crisis also poses an opportunity to build up resilience according to Alain Bejjani, CEO of Emirati retail operator Majid al Futtaim. “In the coming two to three years, we’re going to see, certainly, a very, very large impact that’s going to be asymmetric, depending on the readiness of countries,” Bejjani told CNBC on May 5.

“I think this is a golden opportunity to really change, to reform and to transform our economies into more resilient economies that have (the) ability to bounce back faster,” Bejjani stated. The current crisis could easily accelate reforms and diversification that have resulted in broader opportunities and even improved conditions for women in GCC countries.